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ABSTRACT
PARTY IMPLEMENTATION
HASAN TAHSI˙N APAKAN
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Farhad Husseinov
October 2009
In this study party implementation concept is introduced. Party implemen-
tation is an extension of classical implementation allowing diﬀerent parties to
have group-speciﬁc choice rules. Members of a party are assumed to act co-
operatively according to a common preference. In this context, a choice rule
is said to be party implementable if it is robust to co-operative manipulation.
In this thesis some necessity and suﬃciency results for party implementation
are proven. In particular, it is shown that under some restrictions if the soci-
eties choice rule is party implementable, an alternative that is chosen by any
group should also be chosen by the society. Conversely, it is shown that if the
collective choice can be represented by the union of diﬀerent groups’ choice,
then the social choice rule should be party implementable.
Keywords: Implementation, Party Implementation
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O¨ZET
PARTI˙ YAPISIYLA UYGULANABI˙LI˙RLI˙K
HASAN TAHSI˙N APAKAN
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yard. Doc¸. Dr. Farhad Husseinov
Ekim 2009
Bu c¸alıs¸mada parti yapısıyla uygulanabilirlik kavramı ortaya konulmaktadır.
Parti yapısıyla uygulanabilirlik klasik uygulanabilirlik kavramının partilerin
farklı grup ic¸i sec¸im kurallarına sahip olmasına izin veren bir uzantısıdır.
Bir partinin u¨yelerinin ortak bir tercih sıralamasına go¨re is¸birlig˘i ic¸erisinde
davrandıkları varsayılmıs¸tır. Bu bag˘lamda, bir sec¸im kuralı is¸birlikc¸i ma-
nipulasyona kars¸ı dayanıklı ise, bunun parti yapısıyla uygulanabilir bir ku-
ral oldug˘u so¨ylenir. Bu tezde, parti yapısıyla uygulanabilirlik ile ilgili bazı
gereklilik ve yeterlilik sonuc¸ları ispatlanmıs¸tır. Bazı kısıtlamalar altında,
sosyal sec¸im kuralı parti yapısıyla uygulanabilir ise herhangi bir partinin ter-
cih ettig˘i sec¸eneklerin toplum tarafından da sec¸ilmesi gerektig˘i go¨sterilmis¸tir.
Bunun yanında, sosyal sec¸imler farklı grupların tercihlerin birles¸imi olarak
ifade edilebilirse, sosyal sec¸im kuralının parti yapısıyla uygulanabilir oldug˘u
go¨sterilmis¸tir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uygulanabilirlik, Parti Yapısıyla Uygulanabilirlik
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The standard approach in game theory is to model an interactive situation
in the form of a game1 and to ﬁnd possible outcomes with the help of a
reasonable solution concept. By contrast in implementation theory game is
something to be designed rather than taken; a planner is assumed to set
the rules of the interaction to realize her objectives. With a given solution
concept and some set of desired outcomes, one investigates whether there
exist a game form that yields the same set of outcomes as equilibria. In order
to have a clearer picture, we could describe the implementation framework in
some detail.
The implementation problem starts with a society that desires to choose
an alternative; so there are individuals who have preferences over a set of
alternatives and a procedure called social choice rule that aggregates the
individual preferences to choose some subset of alternatives. One might see
these alternatives as the desirable ones for the society. A planner then is
assumed to design a game form (mechanism) that consists of a strategy space
for each agent and an outcome function. The outcome function associates an
alternative with the proﬁle of strategies.
1A game is a formal description that includes the constraints on the actions that the
players can take and the players interest (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994)
1
Planner designs the game form such that the equilibria of the game (a
game form with realized preferences) are the alternatives chosen by the so-
ciety. When a game is played, some set of moves are speciﬁed by a solution
concept which could be seen as the reasonable equilibria of the game. If
there is such a game form that the correspondence between the social choice
and equilibria takes place for any set of preference proﬁles then we say the
mechanism implements the social choice via the proposed solution concept.
In this thesis implementation via the Nash equilibrium concept will be
useful. Maskin (1999)2 proved some necessity and suﬃciency results about
Nash implementation. He used two concepts called no-veto power and mono-
tonicity.A choice rule is said to be monotonic if an alternative is selected by
a social choice rule for some preference proﬁle, it must also be selected by the
rule for any preference proﬁle, where the relative ranking of the alternative
weakly improves. A choice rule satisﬁes no-veto power if an alternative is
selected whenever all individuals but possibly one ranks that alternative at
the top of the preferences. Maskin showed that monotonicity is necessary
while monotonicity and no-veto power condition together are suﬃcient for
Nash implementation.
In many settings where individuals interact, co-operation and coordina-
tion is possible. Moreover agents care about the others. For example members
of a family or a political party may behave according to a common decision
and they can co-operate their actions. Using these observation one could in-
troduce an implementation framework and an equilibrium concept. First we
will describe the framework and the equilibrium concept. We assume there
are separate groups of individuals which form a partition of all individuals.
These groups have their diﬀerent moral-choice agenda, so that each group has
a unique preference over alternatives which clearly depend upon its members
preferences. A group has a certain procedure for making an aggregate or-
2This study circulated as working paper from 1977 to 1998
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dering for the alternatives, all the preferences of individuals are known to all
the members of the group. We assume the members of a group after learning
the aggregate-group preference, act according to it as if they have the group
preference as their own. This means the individuals are extremely loyal to
their groups aggregate preference. Moreover we assume every group (party)
has a social welfare function; one particular form of this (that we use in our
model) that groups have social choice rules and welfare functions are induced
from them in a natural way.
Besides the extreme-loyalty assumption, we also assume the members of
a group can co-operate; that is in a game situation they can deviate their
actions together. In this framework party equilibrium is deﬁned naturally:
a proﬁle of moves is an equilibrium when no group would like to deviate
its actions. In this way a mechanism is said to party implement a choice
rule within a group structure (as described above) when party equilibrium
of a game (with the induced preferences) are the alternatives chosen by the
rule. The equilibrium concept that we use is a speciﬁc example of a Strong
Nash equilibrium with coalition constraints, but the implementation notion is
diﬀerent from the strong Nash implementation with constraints3 as we assume
individuals use aggregated group preferences.
In Chapter 2 we describe the implementation and party implementation
frameworks formally. In Chapter 3 we present our results. In the ﬁrst part
we prove that under some assumptions if a social choice rule is party imple-
mentable, then any alternative that is chosen by a group should also be chosen
by the society. In the second part we give some suﬃciency condition for party
implementation. Finally we look at party implementation framework in some
speciﬁc context. Then in the last chapter we conclude our discussion and
propose a possible extension of the framework.
3Suh (1996) characterized a variant of Strong Nash Implementation by allowing only
some coalitions to form
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CHAPTER 2
MODEL
2.1 Implementation of Social Choice Corre-
spondences
In this section we deal with the standard implementation framework. In
the next section we will introduce the party implementation framework. A
social choice problem is a triplet (푁,퐴,푅), where 푁 = {1, ...., 푛} is a ﬁnite
individual set, 퐴 is the alternatives set and 푅 = {푅푖}푖∈푁 is a proﬁle of
preference relations deﬁned on 퐴.
Deﬁnition. A preference relation 푅푖 on 퐴 is a binary relation on A which
satisﬁes the following properties:
∙ complete: for any 푎, 푏 ∈ 퐴 with 푎 ∕= 푏, we have 푎푅푖푏 or 푏푅푖푎
∙ trasitive: for any 푎, 푏, 푐 ∈ 퐴, 푎푅푖푏 and 푏푅푖푐 implies 푎푅푖푐
∙ reﬂexive: for any 푎 ∈ 퐴, 푎푅푖푎.
For each agent (individual) 푖, let ℜ푖 denote the set of all possible preference
relations of agent 푖. The set ℜ =∏푖∈푁 ℜ푖 is the set of all preference proﬁles.
Given any preference relation 푅푖, we denote its asymmetric part with 푃푖 and
call it the strict preference induced by 푅푖. Given a preference relation 푅푖 we
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denote its symmetric part with 퐼푖 and call it the indiﬀerence induced by 푅푖.
For any subset 퐾 of the alternative set 퐴, 푅푖[퐾] denotes the intersection of
the preference relation 푅푖 with the set 퐾 ×퐾, that is the restriction of the
preference relation 푅푖 on the set 퐾.
A social choice rule is a correspondence 퐹 :ℜ → 퐴 which maps every
preference proﬁle to a non-empty subset of 퐴. Alternatives in 퐹 (푅) are
interpreted as desirable alternatives for the proﬁle 푅. In a social problem
the planner may not have information about the preferences of agents, so
the planner confronts the individuals with a proper mechanism such that the
strategic solutions of the mechanism corresponds to the social choice.
Deﬁnition. A mechanism (game form) is a pair Γ = (M, 푔) where 푀 =∏
푖∈푁 M푖 is the strategy (action) space and 푔 : M → 퐴 is the outcome
function. Given a mechanism Γ each preference proﬁle 푅 deﬁnes a normal
form game (Γ, 푅).
Deﬁnition. A mechanism Γ = (M, 푔) implements a social choice rule 퐹 (in
Nash equilibria), if for any preference proﬁle 푅 every alternative induced by
a Nash equilibrium of the game (Γ, 푅) is chosen by 퐹 for 푅, and conversely,
every alternative chosen by 퐹 is induced by a Nash equilibrium: ∀푅 ∈ ℜ,
푔(푁(Γ, 푅)) = 퐹 (푅).
We now state some necessity and suﬃciency results about Nash implemen-
tation. Given a preference relation 푅푖 of agent 푖 and an alternative 푎, lower
contour set of 푅푖 according to alternative 푎, 퐿(푅푖, 푎) is the set of alternatives
to which 푎 is weakly preferred under 푅푖, that is 퐿(푅푖, 푎) = {푏 ∈ 퐴 : 푎푅푖푏}.
Deﬁnition. A social choice rule 퐹 is said to satisfy Maskin monotonicity
(or to be Maskin monotonic ) iﬀ for any 푅,푅′ ∈ ℜ with any 푎 ∈ 퐹 (푅)
and for any 푖 ∈ 푁 : the inclusion 퐿(푅푖, 푎) ⊂ 퐿(푅′푖, 푎) implies 푎 ∈ 퐹 (푅′).
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Deﬁnition. A social choice rule 퐹 is said to satisfy no-veto power iﬀ for
each 푅 ∈ ℜ, for each 푎 ∈ 퐴 ∣{푖 ∈ 푁 : 퐿(푅푖, 푎) = 퐴}∣ ≥ ∣푁 ∣ − 1 implies
푎 ∈ 퐹 (푅).
Deﬁnition. A social choice rule 퐹 is said to satisfy neutrality iﬀ for any
permutation mapping 휋 of the alternative set 퐴 and for any preference proﬁle
푅 ∈ ℜ, 퐹 (푅휋) = 휋(퐹 (푅)), where 푅휋 denotes the permuted preference proﬁle.
Deﬁnition. A social choice rule 퐹 is said to satisfy anonymity iﬀ for any
permutation mapping 휎 of the individual set 푁 and for any preference proﬁle
푅 ∈ ℜ, 퐹 (푅휎) = 퐹 (푅), where 푅휎 denotes the permuted preference proﬁle.
Maskin (1999) proved the following results:
Theorem 1. If a social choice rule 퐹 is Nash-Implementable, then it is
Maskin monotonic.
Theorem 2. If a social choice rule 퐹 is Maskin monotonic and satisfy no-
veto power with the individual set ∣푁 ∣ > 3, then it is Nash-Implementable.
2.2 Party Implementation of Social Choice Cor-
respondences
Social choice problem is the same triplet (푁,퐴,푅) as before; but the frame-
work is more complicated as there are parties and their group social choice
rules. A partition Π푁 of N gives the group structure: all members of the
partition are separate groups. Each member of the partition has some kind
of procedure to choose an alternative, that is for any 푆 ∈ Π푁 , there exists
a sequence of social choice rules deﬁned on any subset of the alternative set.
Group-speciﬁc social choice rule (푓푆)[퐾] is a correspondence which maps ev-
ery preference proﬁle of group 푆 on the alternative’s set 퐾 to a non-empty
subset of 퐾. With slight abuse of notation, we will denote this sequence
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{(푓푆)[퐾]}퐾⊂퐴,퐾 ∕=∅ by 푓푆. When we say 푓푆 satisﬁes a property we mean that
(푓푆)[퐾] satisfy that property for every non empty set 퐾 of 퐴. Any group
social choice rule will induce a social welfare function in a natural way. The
chosen alternatives in the ﬁrst round will form the ﬁrst indiﬀerence class.
Then the social choice rule is applied to the rest of the alternatives and the
newly chosen ones will form the second indiﬀerence class. This process goes
on till there is no alternative left.
For any 푅 ∈ ∏푖∈푁 ℜ푖 let 푅푆[퐴] be the projection of preference proﬁle
to agent group 푆 on the alternatives subset 퐾. Formally, the method is as
follows if 푎 ∈ 푓푆(푅푆) and 푏 ∕∈ 푓푆(푅푆) then we write 푎 푃 ∗푆 푏. For the same 푏 if
푏 ∈ 푓푆(푅푆[퐴 ∖ 푓푆(푅푆)]) but 푐 ∕∈ 푓푆(푅푆) and 푐 ∕∈ 푓푆(푅푆[퐴 ∖ 푓푆(푅푆)]), then we
write 푎 푃 ∗푆 푏 푃
∗
푆 푐. Similarly we write 푐 퐼
∗
푆 푑 if 푐, 푑 ∈ 푓푆(푅푆). This method is
applied to the rest of alternatives, so we get two binary relations 퐼∗푆 and 푃
∗
푆 .
Then the union of these binary relations, 푅∗푆, will be the induced preference
of the group 푆 by operation 푧, so 푧(푓푆, 푅푆) = 푅
∗
푆. 푅
∗
푆 is the group ordering of
푆 under 푓푆. Individuals in the group act according to this aggregate ordering,
they play any game as if they have this group preference as their individual
preference’s. We assume when ∣푆∣ = 1, 푓푆 choose the top indiﬀerence class
so that 푧(푓푆, 푅푆) = 푅푆.
We deﬁne a new equilibrium concept for a normal form game which is
dependent on the party environment.
Deﬁnition. A party equilibrium 휎 of a strategic game (M, 푔, 푅) relative
to partition (Π푁) is a proﬁle 푥 ∈ 푀 of messages with the property that for
each 푆 ∈ Π푁 , and for each 푦 ∈M such that for every 푖 ∈ (푁 ∖푆) 푥푖 = 푦푖 ;for
every 푗 ∈ 푆, 푔(푥)푅푗푔(푦).
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(푅,Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ) 퐹 (푅)
∀푆 ∈ Π푁 : 푧(푓푆, 푅푆) = 푅∗푆 ∥
(M, 푔, 푅∗) - 휎(Π푁)(M, 푔, 푅∗)
-
?
휎(Π푁)
Figure 2.1: Party Implementation
That is any coalition can not be better oﬀ by deviating relative to the
induced preference. Our next aim is to ﬁnd a mechanism (M, 푔) such that
휎(Π푁)(M, 푔, 푅
∗) = 퐹 (푅) in an environment (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ), where 푅∗ is the
induced preference as deﬁned above. If there is such a mechanism (M, 푔) that
the previous equation holds for any 푅 with the corresponding induced pref-
erence, then we say 퐹 is party implementable relative to environment
(Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ). Moreover we propose a generalization of Maskin monotonoc-
ity.
Deﬁnition. A social choice rule 퐹 is said to be Group-Maskin monotonic
relative to an environment (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ) if for any 푅,푅′ ∈ ℜ with any
푎 ∈ 퐹 (푅) and for any 푆 ∈ Π푁 such that 퐿(푅∗푆, 푎) ⊂ 퐿(푅′∗푆 , 푎) we have
∈ 퐹 (푅′), where 푅∗푆 = 푧(푓푆, 푅푆) and 푅′∗푆 = 푧(푓푆, 푅′푆).
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
3.1 Necessity Conditions
Proposition 1. Within an environment (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ), if 퐹 is party im-
plementable, then F should be Group-Maskin monotonic relative to that envi-
ronment.
Proof. Since 퐹 is party implementable relative to environment (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 )
and 푎 ∈ 퐹 (푅), there is a party equilibrium, where 푎 is chosen in which the
groups act according to the induced preference 푅∗푆. It follows that there is no
group which can deviate to any better alternative, as the second induced pref-
erence 퐿(푅′푆
∗, 푎) contains 퐿(푅∗푆, 푎). Groups can not deviate as the possible
better alternative set got smaller.
Note: It follows from the previous proposition that if all the group-speciﬁc
social choice rules are Maskin monotonic and 퐹 is party implementable, then
퐹 should be Maskin monotonic.
Proposition 2. In an environment (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ) assume ∣푁 ∣ ≥ 3 and
there exists a coalition(a member of the partition) 푆 with at least two mem-
bers which satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity, neutrality and anonymity. Then if
퐹 satisﬁes the same assumptions with no-veto power and F is party imple-
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mentable relative to environment (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ), F should choose all the top
alternatives.That is 퐹 (푅) ⊃ 퐴,where 퐴 = {푎 ∈ 퐴: ∃푖 ∈ 푁 : ∀푏 ∈ 퐴, 푎푅푖푏 }.
Proof. For the most part of the proof we will use only two types of preferences,
namely type 1 and type 2. Then we will generalize our results to full domain
of preferences using Maskin monotonicity of the social choice rules. Assuming
푎 is in the alternative set, let type 1 be such that: ∀푏 ∈ 퐴∖{푎}: 푎푃푏 and type
2: ∀푏 ∈ 퐴 ∖ {푎}: 푏푃푎. Moreover, for both type 1 and type 2; and for each d,c
∈ 퐴 ∖ {푎} 푑퐼푐, where P denotes strict preference and I denotes indiﬀerence.
In matrices types will be shown as:
type 1:
⎛⎜⎝ 푎
퐴 ∖ {푎}
⎞⎟⎠ type 2:
⎛⎜⎝ 퐴 ∖ {푎}
푎
⎞⎟⎠
Then construct a preference proﬁle R such that only one individual j has
type 2 preference and the rest have type 1. Assume 푗 ∈ 푆, then as 퐹 is no
veto power we have 푎 ∈ 퐹 (푅).Then assume 푓푆(푅푆) ∕⊃ {푎}, where
푅∗푆 =
⎛⎜⎝ 퐴 ∖ {푎}
푎
⎞⎟⎠
With the help of the Proposition 1 one could change the preferences of
all the individuals in 푆 to type 2. This operation would not change the
group preference as 푓푆 is Maskin monotonic. So that 퐹 should still choose
the alternative 푎. Then by anonymity of 퐹 , one could change the place of
a single individual from 푆 with another outside 푆, then as 푅∗푆 is same with
type 2 preference, one could repeat the same operation until all the members
of 푁 have type 2 preference. Then by Maskin monotonicity of 퐹 we get 퐹 is
the constant-all rule1. We are done.
1Constant-all Rule choose all the alternatives for any preference proﬁle.
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Now assume 푓푆(푅푆) ⊃ {푎}. By using an algorithm below we will make
everyone’s preference outside 푆 of type 2. In the new preference proﬁle 푎 is
still chosen. Algorithm is as follows:
Step 1 Change the place of an individual with type 2 preference inside 푆
with another individual of type 1 preference outside 푆.
Step 2 Change the preference of a single individual within 푆 to type 2.
Step 3 After Step 2 turn back to Step 1, stop the algorithm when Step 1 is
not achievable.
This way we eventually will have everyone outside coalition 푆 to have type
2 preference, as 푎 is always top ranked by groups after step 1 and step 2 are
executed. By Proposition 1 as the lower contour set did not get smaller, we
will have 퐹 (푅) ⊃ {푎}. Denote this new preference proﬁle 푅.
푅 could be written like this, without loss of generality, as 퐹 is anonymous:
푅 =
⎛⎜⎝ 푎 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푎 퐴 ∖ {푎} ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 퐴 ∖ {푎}
퐴 ∖ {푎} ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 퐴 ∖ {푎} 푎 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푎
⎞⎟⎠
푓푆 could be the constant-all rule or not. Assume 푓푆 is not constant all
rule.
Claim. Assuming 푓푆 is not constant all rule, there exists a group preference
proﬁle 푅′′푆 with only type 1 or type 2 preferences such that 푓푆(푅
′′
푆) ⊃ {푎} and
with the property that if a single individual switches his preference from type
1 to type 2, then alternative 푎 will not be chosen by 푓푆.
Proof of Claim: Algorithm: take 푅푆 such that everyone has type 1
preference. In each step change a single individual’s preference to 푡푦푝푒 2. Do
this till 푎 is not chosen, then the preference in the previous step will have the
properties of 푅′′푆 in the claim. This process should stop somewhere as 푓푆 is
not constant-all, neutral and Maskin monotonic. Claim is proved.
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By the help of Proposition 1 change 푅푆 to 푅
′′
푆, where 푅
′′
푆 has the property
stated in the claim and 퐹 (푅−푆, 푅′′푆) ⊃ {푎}. Then by anonymity change the
places of an individual who has type 1 preference in 푆 with another individual
with type 2 preference in the set 푁 ∖ 푆. Then as the stated properties of 푅′′푆
show, 푎 is not chosen in the new proﬁle, so group preference of 푆 will be of
type 2. Now by ﬁrst the observation we can make everyone’s preference inside
푆 of type 2, without changing the chosen alternative. Now everyone but a
single individual has type 2 preference. Then we get 퐹 should choose all the
top alternatives.
If 푓푆 is constant-all rule, then 퐹 should be constant-all rule too. This
is similar to the ﬁrst part of the proof. Make everyone in 푆 bottom rank
alternative 푎 and change the places with individuals outside 푆. Since group
preference do not change, eventually we will have everyone bottom rank 푎.
Corollary. Assume all assumptions of the Proposition 2 are satisﬁed. As-
sume moreover that there exists a coalition 푆 in the partition such that 푓푆
does not choose a top alternative in some 푅′ and all the group-speciﬁc so-
cial choice rules are Maskin monotonic. If 퐹 is party implementable then it
should be constant-all rule.
Proof. Take a preference proﬁle 푅′ such that agent 푗 in the coalition 푆 top
ranks 푎 but 푓푆(푅
′) ∕⊃ {푎}. Then take another preference proﬁle 푅 such that
only player 푗 has type 1 preference and all the other players have type 2
preferences. Alternative 푎 should be chosen by Proposition 1.
As 푓푆 is Maskin monotonic, 푓푆(푅) ∕⊃ {푎}, that is 푧(푓푆, 푅푆) is a type 2
preference, so make everyone bottom rank 푎 in 푆. By Proposition 1 alter-
native 푎 should still be chosen. By Maskin monotonicity 퐹 is constant-all
rule.
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Theorem 3. Assume all the conditions of the Corollary 1 for a social choice
rule 퐹 and for an environment (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ) are satisﬁed. If 퐹 is party im-
plementable relative to that environment, then the expression
∪
푆∈Π푁 푓푆(푅푆) ⊂
퐹 (푅) must hold for any 푅.
Proof. By Corollary 1 we know that this expression holds if some 푓푆(푅푆) does
not choose a top alternative. So we can assume they do choose all the top
alternatives. Moreover, assume the expression above does not hold. Then
there exists a preference proﬁle 푅 such that 푎 ∕∈ 퐹 (푅) but 푎 ∈ 푓푇 (푅푇 ) for
some 푇 ∈ Π푁 . By Proposition 2 alternative 푎 should not be top-ranked by any
individual. Take 푗 ∈ 푇 and make 푗 top ranks alternative 푎 without changing
the preference relations of any other individual. Call this new preference
proﬁle 푅′푇 . We know 푎 ∈ 푓푇 (푅′푇 ), so 퐿(푅∗푇 , 푎) = 퐿(푅′∗푇 , 푎) but we have
푎 ∈ 퐹 (푅−푇 , 푅′푇 ). This implies 푎 ∈ 퐹 (푅) by Group-Maskin monotonicity of
퐹 . Thus we obtain contradiction.
Remarks
∙ When there is no 푆 such that ∣푆∣ ≥ 2, we will have only singletons as
groups. Moreover we preserve our assumption 푧(푓푆, 푅푆) = 푅
∗
푆 = 푅푆 for
singleton coalitions. As a result our implementation notion boils down
to Nash-implementation.
∙ If on the other edge Π푁 = {푁} with 푓푁 = 퐹 the rule will be party-
implementable as a result of a further observation.
Claim. If 푓푁 ∕= 퐹 , that is if there exists 푅 with 푓푁(푅) ∕= 퐹 (푅), F will
not be party implementable.
Proof. Assume 퐹 is party-implementable.
It is clear that 푓푁 ⊃ 퐹 must hold since otherwise some coalition would
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deviate to any other alternative 푎 ∈ 푓푁(푅).
The other direction is also clear: assume the opposite. Then there must
be a message proﬁle 푀 ∈ ∏푖∈푁 M푖 in which 푔(푀) = {푎} where 푎 ∈
푓푁(푅) but 푎 ∕∈ 퐹 (푅), where 푎 is clearly chosen by a party equilibrium,
Contradiction.
∙ When ∣푁 ∣ > ∣퐴∣ there is a social choice rule with the properties stated
in the Proposition 2 which does not choose every top alternative. Let’s
deﬁne this rule as 퐹 choose alternatives that at least two agents top
rank. So by pigeon-hole principle this rule is non-empty, and other
properties are easy to show. As we see from this observation, there are
Maskin monotonic, neutral, anonymous and no veto power social choice
rules that are not party implementable relative to any environment
(Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ) with 푓푆 having the properties stated in the Prop. 2.
3.2 A Suﬃciency Condition
Proposition 3. In an environment (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ), where 푁 ≥ 3,
if the equation
∪
푆∈Π푁 푓푆(푅푆) = 퐹 (푅) holds, then 퐹 is party implementable.
Proof. Assume 퐹 chooses only alternatives that at least one agent top ranks.
Then 퐹 is Maskin monotonic and no-veto power. By Theorem 2 (Maskin)
퐹 should be Nash implementable if 푁 ≥ 3. So using this observation take a
single individual from each group and name this set 푁1. Then with a slight
abuse of notation we have
∪
푆∈Π푁 푓푆(푅푆) = 퐹 (푅) = 퐹 (푅
∗
푁1
) = 퐹 (푅), where
푅∗푁1 is the projection of the induced 푅
∗ onto set 푁1. Then take the Nash
mechanism of 퐹 for the set 푁1, and add non eﬀective moves for 푁 ∖ 푁1,
so it is a game for 푁 . That is if the Nash mechanism is (
∏
푖∈푁1(M푖), 푔)
take (
∏
푖∈푁(M푖), 푔
′) as a new mechanism, where for each 푚 ∈∏푖∈푁∖푁1(M푖),
푔(푚) = 푔(푚, 푎). Then Nash equilibrium of this game clearly corresponds
with the party equilibrium relative to the group structure.
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3.3 Party Implementation with veto power
It is easy to observe that Proposition 2 needs the assumption called the no-
veto power; take the veto-free correspondence for instance that is 퐹 (푅) =
{푎 ∈ 퐴 : there is no 푖 ∈ 푁 : ∀푏 ∈ 퐴, 푏푃푖푎}. This correspondence is non-
empty when ∣푁 ∣ < ∣퐴∣ and it has the other properties stated in Prop. 1.
Take any rule which is contained in the veto-free correspondence; then if it is
party implementable in a (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ) environment then any 푓푆 such that
푆 ∈ Π푁 , where 푓푆 is monotonic will satisfy the veto power property. This
is easy to see, take the preference proﬁle in the beginning of Proposition 2,
where 푎 is not chosen by 퐹 , as the individual 푗 vetos alternative 푎. On the
other hand, as 푓푆 satisﬁes the no-veto power assumption alternative 푎 should
be chosen. Change everyone’s preference to type 1, so that 푎 should be chosen
in the new preference proﬁle. But as 퐹 is Group-Maskin monotonic, we have
a contradiction.
3.4 Party Implementation of Constant-All Cor-
respondence
In an environment (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ) if there exists 푆, 푇,퐾 ∈ Π푁 all distinct,
then mechanism with the message space 푀푖 = (퐴 ×N) for each individual
where N is the natural numbers set, party implements 퐹 . In the mechanism
if an alternative is played by all groups except one, corresponding alternative
will be chosen irrespective of the integers chosen. In other instances the al-
ternative is chosen by the individual who says the highest integer. There is
an unimportant tie-breaking rule. This mechanism party-implements F (the
constant-all rule) relative to environment (Π푁 , {푓푆}푆∈Π푁 ), as for any alterna-
tive 푎 there is a party-equilibrium, where all groups choose that alternative.
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3.5 Existence of a Dictatorial Social Choice
Rule
When there is a dictatorial choice rule 푓푆 for a set 푆 ∈ Π푁 with the property
∣푆∣ ≥ 2, if F is a social choice rule with the properties in the proposition 2,
퐹 should choose all the top alternatives
Proof. A shorter version of the Proposition 2’s proof.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we introduced a new setup for implementation. We assumed
there are groups which have distinct social choice rules. These groups act
cooperatively according to a common aggregated preference. On this frame-
work a new implementation notion called party-implementation is introduced.
In brief a social choice rule is said to be party implementable if there is a
mechanism which is robust to any group-speciﬁc manipulation. Our most
important ﬁnding is that under some restrictions if the societies choice rule is
party implementable, an alternative that is chosen by any group should also
be chosen by the society. Secondly, a suﬃcient condition for party implemen-
tation is given; it is shown that if the collective choice can be represented
by the union of diﬀerent groups’ choice, then the social choice rule should
be implementable. Within various environments some distinct conditions are
given for party-implementation. To sum up we can say that, in many plau-
sible environments, where parties and societies have very distinct procedures
for choosing an alternative, party implementability is hard to achieve.
On the other hand, some further research is possible; one could generalize
the party environment with a suitable network structure where the links be-
tween individuals show whether individuals care about the others. Moreover,
one could relax the assumption that all the members of some coalition act
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according to the same common preference, they may have distinct ways of
caring about the other’s preferences. The equilibrium notion can be gener-
alized allowing diﬀerent coalitions to act cooperatively. In such a setup new
robustness conditions for implementability can be proposed.
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